The most popular are psychological-continuity views, according to which the holding of some psychological relation is necessary or sufficient or both for one to persist. Consciousness can be transferred from one substance to another, and thus, while the soul is changed, consciousness remains the same, thereby preserving the personal identity through the change.
Our bodies grow and regenerate and may contain different matter over time, our mental faculties provide continuity where matter cannot. If memory provides us with a false or misleading record do we thus have a false identity?
The problem of personal identity is at the centre of discussions about life after death and immortality. Then we can ask whether we are referring twice to one thing, or once to each of two things.
It is consistent with the existence of wholly inorganic people: This is usually interpreted to mean that identity consists of facts about memory: And it implies that our persistence conditions differ from those of immaterial people, if they are possible.
I am my body. First, some attempts to cash out personal identity relations in psychological terms appeal exclusively to direct psychological connections. The psychological approach is true.
An answer to it is an account of our persistence conditions. The notion seemed ridiculous!
The recipient would think that he is the donor—and, according to the psychological view, others should think the same.
And insofar as the candidates have different histories and different persistence conditions, it would be indeterminate when we came into being and what it takes for us to persist Sider b.
The psychological view versus animalism Coincident entities A powerful set of criticismsraised in the late 20th century, has to do with the intuitively plausible assumption that persons are human animals.
Appeal to causal and cognitive connections which relate not only memory but other psychological aspects is sufficient to eradicate the problem.
From this it follows that Premise 6: The question is roughly what is necessary and sufficient for a past or future being to be someone existing now.With an idealist view of a non-physical self, that also possesses continuity and unity it can be exposed how flawed this view of self is, and how others play no role whatsoever in the formation of the self.
Some proponents of the psychological view have responded by saying that what personal identity consists of is not psychological continuity itself but “nonbranching” psychological continuity, the fission cases being examples of “branching” psychological continuity.
In conclusion, after providing examples to counterclaim Locke’s argument that personal identity originates from psychological continuity it is clear that Locke’s view on identity is too flawed to be correct when defining identity for each person.
1William, Uzgalis. A further significant objection to psychological continuity is the opposing physical continuity argument. This argues that the continuity of our identity is provided by the continuity of our bodies.
This would immediately avoid Russell's objection (above) as our extension in time is only defined by the extension in time of our bodies. In philosophy, the matter of personal identity deals with such questions as, "What makes it true that a person at one time is the same thing as a person at another time?" or "What kinds of things are we persons?" Generally, personal identity is the unique numerical identity of a person in the course of time.
psychology Essays | See the List of Sample Papers For Free - Bla Bla Writing. Save your time and order an essay about psychology. Get Started. Erickson’s Psychosocial theory of psychosocial development.
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